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ABSTRACT 
 
This article reviews changes taking place in the business environment and in 
the field of strategic management, contrasting the traditional industrial organizational 
economics paradigm with the new hypercompetitive or Austrian paradigm. It then 
demonstrates the implications of this paradigm shift in a detailed examination of the 
concept of organizational slack, highlighting new forms, applications and value for 
slack in the new hypercompetitive environment. 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
It almost goes without saying that the world of business is no longer what it 
once was.  Technology, globalization, political and social forces have drastically 
changed the business environment.  As D'Aveni notes, "Business has entered an age 
of new realities" (D'aveni 1994, p. xiii).  These "new realities" with their focus on 
flexibility and speed, have impacted every area of management thought. 
  
If the popular management press is to be believed, flexibility and adaptation 
will be the hallmarks not just of successful organizations in the near future, but of the 
surviving ones.  Prescriptions are being written for "virtual corporations" (Davidow & 
Malone, 1992) and "liberation management" (Peters, 1992)--normative advice for 
"structuring and revitalizing the corporation for the 21st century" (Davidow & 
Malone) as well as for managing "in the nanosecond Nineties" (Peters).  Old tools and 
time-honored conceptualizations no longer work as effectively as they have in the 
past.  
 
The concepts and models of traditional strategic management theory, for 
example, have come under increasing attack.  Hamel and Prahalad (1989) state that, 
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rather than being helpful, "...the application of concepts such as 'strategic fit', 'generic 
strategies', and the 'strategic hierarchy' have often abetted the process of competitive 
decline." (p.63).  This is in great part because in many industries the basic 
assumptions underlying the paradigm upon which strategic management was 
developed no longer hold sway. 
 
Mainstream strategic management thought has long been centered in the 
assumptions of neoclassical microeconomic theory conveyed through industrial 
organization (IO) economics.  According to this paradigm, competitive markets move 
toward an equilibrium wherein each firm earns a return just sufficient to warrant 
continued investment (zero economic profits).  Sustained Profits exist only where 
competition is constrained in its ability to force this movement to equilibrium.   
 
IO economists, whose central concern has been public policy, have focused on 
how to limit this monopoly power.  Researchers in strategic management, on the other 
hand, have used the IO economists' structural analyses to determine how to sustain 
monopoly power and accompanying profits (e.g., Porter 1980).  The premise that 
profitability is rooted in the restriction of competitive forces has in turn led to several 
strategic concepts and prescriptions.  Basic to strategic management have been the 
ideas of industry forces, entry barriers, exit barriers, mobility barriers, strategic 
groups, generic strategies, strategic fit and sustainable competitive advantage.   
 
These concepts have benefited from the analytical framework of IO economics, 
but they also suffer from its weaknesses.  Teece (1985) has noted these weaknesses as 
including: focus on static analysis, focus on equilibrium, inadequacy of the theory of 
the firm, suppression of entrepreneurship, and treatment of know-how.  He noted that, 
"the fact that technological and organizational change is such an important and 
pervasive aspect of reality and yet so peripheral in economic theory may be the single 
most important consideration limiting the contribution of orthodox economics to 
issues in strategic management." (p. 38) 
 
  In a time of measured thought and stable competition, the strengths of the IO 
model compensated for its weaknesses.  This may no longer be the case.  As D'Aveni 
(1994) has written, "The formal approaches to strategic planning are more appropriate 
for environments of traditional, slower and less aggressive competition...characterized 
by long periods of stability between disruptions.  These periods call for more of an 
emphasis on carefully considered thought and deliberate action.  Hypercompetitive 
environments, on the other hand, draw more upon the instant reaction and reflexes 
of the company." (p. 237). 
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In order to accommodate the reality of the new environment, the field of 
strategic management is beginning to undergo a fundamental shift from its traditional 
industrial organization paradigm, founded on the static concepts of neoclassical 
economic theory, to a more dynamic paradigm which draws from alternate 
conceptions of the market found in the writings of Schumpeter, Mises, Hayek, and 
others, often identified as the Austrian School (c.f., D'Aveni, 1994; Jacobson, 1992).  
  
This alternative economic view is that markets are consistently unstable and 
rarely achieve equilibrium. The focus of this view is on entrepreneurial activity, 
discovery, and innovation.  Competitive advantage and accompanying supra-normal 
profits are presumed to be short-term in nature as competitors adopt similar behaviors. 
Entrepreneurial activity is disruptive in the market and causes them to move away 
from equilibrium (Schumpeter, 1934).  This thesis suggests pervasive attempts to 
move the organization and the host industry away from the stability traditionally 
attributed to equilibrium.  The keys to survival and profitability are innovation and a 
focus on disrupting rather than sustaining the status quo.  A comparison of the 
traditional Industrial Organization paradigm and the new Austrian paradigm are 
presented in figure one.   
 
Figure 1:  Key Factors in Each Strategic Management Paradigm 
 
I.O. Paradigm 
create sustainable advantage 
fit: firm and environment 
monopoly rents 
restrict competitive forces 
assumed stable (equilibrium) 
 
 
Austrian Paradigm 
innovation/entrepreneurship 
disruption of status quo 
attack openings 
flexibility 
dynamic model 
Because these paradigms establish the assumptions and theory which inform 
basic research and thinking in business, this shift in underlying economic foundations 
has profound implications.  It demands a reexamination and reconstruction of 
traditional management concepts and constructs based on the new assumptions and 
premises of this paradigm.   
 
II. ORGANIZATIONAL SLACK:  AN OVERVIEW 
 
One accepted concept that needs to be looked at again is that of organizational 
slack.  Different authors have variously defined slack, but it is basically understood to 
be excess or uncommitted resources, traditionally viewed as providing a cushion 
between the firm and unanticipated discontinuities in the environment.  Much has 
been written on the forms, characteristics and applications of slack, but, drawing from 
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the I.O. paradigm, these papers have typically assumed (often implicitly) a goal of 
sustainable competitive advantage and a basically stable competitive environment.  A 
shift to a more dynamic paradigm and different view of the market environment (to 
what D'Aveni 1994 calls "hypercompetition") changes the strategic nature and value 
of slack and calls for a reexamination of traditional forms of slack creation, 
recognition, and application. 
 
1. DEFINITIONS OF SLACK  
 
Historically, effective organizations have been those which not only are 
efficient, but which also possess resources sufficient to deal with unexpected 
environmental turbulence (Thompson, 1967).  These resources represent 
organizational slack, an idea introduced by Cyert and March in their book A 
Behavioral Theory of the Firm (1963). In their view, organizational slack is the 
balance between resources held by an organization and the total demand for those 
resources by both internal and external entities. 
 
Bourgeois (1981) reviewed this and other definitions of slack in the literature, 
before offering his own definition, which he called a "condensed paraphrase" of 
March's work: 
 
Organizational slack is that cushion of actual or potential 
resources which allows an organization to adapt successfully to internal 
pressures for adjustment or to external pressures for change in policy, as 
well as to initiate changes in strategy with respect to the external 
environment" (Bourgeois, p.30). 
 
According to Nohria and Gulati (1996), slack is simply, Athe pool of resources 
in an organization that is in excess of the minimum necessary to produce a given level 
of organizational output.@(p. 1246).  Bourgeois and Singh (1983) add more specific 
dimensions to the concept of slack.  They state that slack is 
 
... composed of three interrelated but conceptually distinct 
dimensions; availability, recoverability and potentiality.  Available slack 
consists of resources that are not yet assimilated into the technical design 
of the organization.  Recoverable slack consists of resources that have 
been absorbed into the system design as excess costs.  However, these 
resources may be recovered and reallocated during times of adversity.  
Potential slack consists of the capacity of the organization to generate 
extra resources from the environment, as by raising additional debt or 
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equity capital" (pg. 43).  
 
Available slack has commonly been measured using the current ratio (current 
assets/current liabilities) of a firm, representing resources that are not being used, but 
are readily available (Bourgeois, 1981; Cheng & Kesner, 1997; Geiger & Cashen, 
2002).  Recoverable slack has been represented by the ratio of selling and general 
administrative expenses divided by sales (SC&G/sales).  This type of slack Acan best 
be thought of as resources that are absorbed into the firm in the form of expenses 
which are greater than those needed by the firm.  For example, firms may employ 
more individuals than necessary to operate effectively year round.@ (Geiger and 
Cashen, 2002, p. 72).  Finally, Potential slack is the ability of the firm to gain extra 
resources through debt or equity.  It is commonly operationalized using a firm=s debt 
to equity ratio. 
 
By extension, slack that is applied (i.e., that is no longer available) but is used 
in a way that is not recoverable is simply no longer slack.  The strategic advantage 
accruing from such slack is gone.  The implication is that management should 
concentrate first on identifying additional sources of potential slack, then on 
exercising due care in applying that slack in consumptive ways that reduce its 
availability. 
 
Sharfman, Wolf, Chase, and Tansik (1988) examined the antecedents of 
organizational slack located in the firm characteristics (e.g., size, age, performance, 
etc.) and its environment (e.g., munificence, speed and size of change, life cycle, etc.). 
 They also distinguished between high and low discretion slack, based on the 
flexibility of the slack resources -- the variety of situations to which the resources may 
be applied and the range of options available to managers in their use.  Examples of 
high discretion slack include cash, cash equivalents, credit lines, raw materials, 
inventory, low skilled labor, and highly flexible machine capacity.  Low discretion 
slack includes processed inventory, skilled labor, and low flexible machine capacity.  
The authors theorized that high and low discretion slack would be dictated by 
different pressures and would co vary negatively.  That is, "situation-specific uses of 
low discretion slack are not likely to be found at the same time when flexibility and 
high discretion slack are needed" (p. 602). 
 
2. APPLICATIONS OF SLACK 
 
Several possible uses for slack have been suggested in the literature.  Cyert and 
March (1963) give examples of ways slack could be used, including: payment of 
excessive dividends; charging prices lower than necessary to retain customers; paying 
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wages higher than necessary to retain labor; providing perquisites to executives; and 
allowing unit growth beyond relative contributions (p. 36).  In this role slack produces 
performance smoothing: lower in good times and higher in bad times. While other 
functions for slack have been suggested, the focus of much of this theory and research 
has been on slack as a buffer between the firm and its environment.  Thompson 
(1967), for example, argued that the primary use of slack is to protect the firm from its 
environment; to "buffer the technical core".  Sharfman, et al. stress that slack 
resources "give the firm leeway in managing changes in response to a changing 
environment" (p. 601).  
 
In his definition, Bourgeois (1981) assigns the following roles to organizational 
slack: First, it is a cushion of resources which, "prevents a tightly wound organization 
from rupturing in the face of a surge of activity" (p. 30); and Second, it assists top 
management in "initiating and executing strategic changes" (p. 31) by enabling an 
organization both to adjust to shifts in the environment and to "experiment with new 
postures" (ibid).  Bourgeois further suggests that slack serves four primary functions: 
(1) as an inducement for organizational actors to remain within the system, (2) as a 
resource for conflict resolution, (3) as a buffering mechanism in the workflow 
process, or (4) as a facilitator of certain types of strategic or creative behavior within 
the organization (p. 31).  Bourgeois examines each of these functions in detail, further 
dividing the last function into three sections: innovation, satisficing, and politics. 
 
In other work, Singh (1986) found a positive relationship between slack and 
risk taking.  Meyer (1982) argued that slack can be stored in different forms (e.g., 
financial resources, human resources, and technology) which buffer differently from 
environmental jolts.  Hambrick and D'Aveni (1988) felt that slack was "obviously 
important" (p. 5) to include in a study on corporate failures.  They found loss of 
potential slack to be an early indicator of corporate bankruptcies, though a measure of 
available slack (ratio of working capital to sales) was significantly less for bankrupt 
firms only in the last year before the bankruptcy.  Dess and Origer (1987) indicated 
that those organizations competing in "munificent" environments enjoy increased 
opportunities to acquire slack resources. Chakravarthy (1982) offered a 
complementary argument stating that organizations in hostile environments focus 
much of their attention and energies on the preservation of existing resources rather 
than the pursuit of excess or slack resources.  
 
Slack has also been related to innovation and environmental adaptation (c.f., 
Nohria & Gulati, 1996).  In a study of organizations= responses to environmental 
shifts, Cheng and Kesner (1997) contrast the concepts of slack as a buffer and slack as 
a resource for innovation.  They suggest that the presence of slack as a buffer, Amight 
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actually reduce a firm=s aggressiveness in responding to environmental shifts, and 
they are in direct opposition to the earlier view of slack-as-resources for innovation 
and change.@ (P. 4).  Their results showed that the relationship between slack and a 
firm=s environmental response is contingent on whether the firm has an external or 
internal focus.  Nohria and Gulati (1997) review the arguments for both positive and 
negative relationships between slack and innovation.  On the one hand, slack frees up 
resources for experimentation and adaptation.  On the other hand, slack can lead to lax 
discipline and a sense of complacency decreasing the impetus for innovation. Based 
on their review of the literature, the authors predicted and subsequently found an 
inverse U-shaped relationship between slack and innovation in organizations.  Either 
too little or too much slack was associated with decreased innovation.  Geiger and 
Cashen (2002) expanded this study by examining whether the relation between slack 
and innovation differed among the three dimensions of slack.  They found curvilinear 
relationships between innovation and recoverable and available slack and a linear 
relation between innovation and potential slack. 
 
 Bourgeois (1981) notes the possible use of slack as a resource for innovation, 
but he deals with this use as only one third of one of the four functions of slack which 
he addresses.  He suggests several operational measures of slack including inventories 
(raw materials, work in process, and finished goods) and excess capacity, which allow 
the organization to adjust to changes in its environment (such as market demand). 
 
Inherent in the typical presentation of slack is the concept of sustaining 
advantage by buffering the core, responding to environmental change, adjusting to 
new forces.  Slack allows the organization to respond, to deal with immediate 
pressures while adjusting for the future.  The question arises, though--do these 
definitions and applications continue to be valid in perpetually turbulent times, or are 
they in need of reexamination?   
 
3. CHANGING STRUCTURES, CHANGING ROLES 
 
Is the traditional view of slack truly just a "fortuitous contriving"?  The world 
of business has changed as have the basic premises of dealing with it.  How does slack 
fit into an Austrian perspective on strategic management?   
 
According to D'Aveni (1994) competitive advantages tend to erode quickly in 
hypercompetitive environments (the type characterizing most of business today).  
Traditional strategic concepts centered on maintaining these advantages, therefore, 
"are about as effective as shoveling sand against the tide" (p. 235).  Companies 
succeed (maintain profitability) in this environment through the process of "creative 
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destruction" (Schumpeter, 1934).  The key is not sustaining advantages, but 
consistently generating new advantages through disrupting the status quo of the 
industry.   
 
Over the last decade, companies have been attempting to adjust to the new 
competitive environment by focusing on efficiency, reasoning that lean organizations 
will be able to respond more quickly.  The key capabilities needed to succeed in this 
environment, however, are not efficiency but flexibility and innovation.  Slack is no 
less important in this new environment, but its value lies in its contribution to 
innovation and flexibility not its buffering of the core.  See Figure 2 for a comparison 
of these views of slack. 
 
Figure 2: Old Slack vs. New Slack (Virtual Flexibility) 
 
Old Slack 
Buffer the core 
Respond to Change 
Solution to Workflow Problems 
Capital Investments (inventories, 
excess capacity) 
New Slack 
High Discretion 
Create change 
Speed and Surprise 
Innovation 
Flexible Capabilities 
Investments in people, R&D 
 
The new strategies, "stress flexible resources, such as capabilities for speed and 
surprise, which can be deployed in countless ways to carry out visions that last for 
short periods of time" (D'Aveni 1994; p. 239).  This vision of slack places great 
emphasis on what Sharfman et al. called discretionary slack, with much less emphasis 
on non-discretionary slack.  Traditional forms of slack such as excess capacity may in 
fact have a negative impact on performance.  As D'Aveni notes, "Fixed capabilities, 
such as investments in plants and other resources, tend to commit a company to a 
certain course of action.  In hypercompetition, companies develop flexible capabilities 
that enhance their actions but do not give away their strategic position" (p. 270). 
 
Stress is also placed on the speed with which slack can be accessed.  If slack 
exists but cannot be used fairly quickly (available slack) its value is greatly reduced in 
this new environment.  It is our contention that recoverability is not just a function of 
access and process, but also speed--that is, in the current and predicted business 
environment only recoveries and conversions that can be accomplished quickly, in the 
short term, can rightly be considered to be recoverable (Volberda, 1996; Larson, 
2001). In their study relating slack to innovation, Nohria and Gulati (1996), for 
example, focused on short-term slack, which they defined as excess resources that can 
be recovered within a year. 
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This concept can be better understood by setting it in the context of prior slack 
theories.  These theories, as reviewed earlier, viewed slack as potential, available, 
recoverable, and non-recoverable. To this we add the notion of speed of application, 
that is whether the application is for the long term or short term.  These conditions can 
be arrayed as follows: 
 
Figure Three: Traditional Categories of Slack 
 
Potential 
Available 
Recoverable 
Nonrecoverable 
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In traditional slack theories the top three categories have been considered 
"slack"--"nonrecoverable" slack is, by definition, no longer a slack resource. A new 
typology, we suggest would shift that array by reclassifying “recoverable (long term)" 
slack into the "nonrecoverable" category, for all intents and purposes.  This is not 
significantly different, from the traditional model.  We propose, though, that 
"potential (long term)" slack also be excluded; examples of this might be capital 
raised in external markets (including stock issues).  The residual categories, (potential 
[short term], available, and recoverable [short term]) we call " attainable slack"--the 
sort that is most likely to provide "virtual flexibility".  The reconfigured list would 
appear as follows: 
 
Figure Four:  New Categories of Slack 
 
Potential (long term) 
Potential (short term)      Attainable 
Available                     Attainable 
Recoverable (short term)  Attainable 
Recoverable (long term) 
Nonrecoverable 
 
In hypercompetitive environments, investment in attainable slack should lead to 
superior long-term performance by providing the resources necessary to enable the 
firm to develop those capabilities most needed in today’s world: flexibility, 
innovation, and learning.  Investment in other types of slack may profitably be 
discontinued. 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
In light of the changes that have occurred in the general business environment 
in recent years, we suggest that the traditional concept of organizational slack be 
reexamined and reconceptualized. We also suggest that this reconceptualization, 
reflecting as it does the shortened timelines and heightened decision sensitivities of 
the current and foreseeable business environment, constitutes a sort of "virtual 
flexibility".  Effective organizations will quickly adapt operations to exclude slack 
applications that no longer help create competitive advantages but continue to invest 
in those that do. 
 
The traditional perspective of slack as a buffer to the technical core or excess 
resources which allow a firm to respond to changes in the environment no longer 
holds the power it once did.  At best this is now a partial and short-term view, 
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centered in attempts to defend a position and sustain advantage; generating profits 
through restricted competition.  This will protect the firm for a short while, but it 
won't keep out the tide of change. 
 
  The emphasis on slack may now be more profitably placed on resources which 
are quickly attainable, highly discretionary, and which will aid the firm in disrupting 
the status quo; generating profits through innovation, speed, surprise, and flexibility 
(c.f., Lawson, 2001). 
 
While the new competitive environment places a premium on speed and 
flexibility ("lean" businesses), the "downsizing" of organizations so recently in vogue 
must be managed with extreme caution so as not to eliminate the slack that ensures 
the long-term prosperity of the firm.  Slack resources (i.e., not fully utilized) are still 
important in this new environment.  It is not efficiency but innovation that is the key 
to survival.  By allowing its researchers 10% of their time to work on their own 
projects, for example, 3M corporation helps ensure its continuing leadership in 
product innovation.   
 
Bourgeois's (1981) concern that, "too much of management and administrative 
theory is preoccupied with ferreting it [slack] out and eliminating it through 
efficiency-seeking optimization principles" (p. 38), is even more valid in today's 
hypercompetitive environment.  The key is to understand the difference between slack 
and waste, and to recognize and implement the right type of slack consistent with a 
broader picture of the long-term prosperity of the firm.  There has been a shift in the 
role of slack in the present environment, but it remains a key to survival and 
profitability.  Its use should be carefully planned by every organization. 
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